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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HELEN STARTIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
WAYNE L. STARTIN,
Defendant-Respondent,:

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The Plaintiff, Helen Startin filed an action in divorce.
The Defendant, Wayne L. Startin, answered and Counterclaimed.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court awarded the Plaintiff a divorce on her
Complaint and also awarded the Defendant a divorce on his Counter
claim.

The court ordered that the parties' home be sold with the

net equity to be divided as follows:
a.

The first $8,000 to appellant representing the

money she brought into the marriage, either individually or as a
result of inheritance; and
b.

The remainder divided equally between the appellant

and Respondent.
The court further ordered that if Plaintiff desired to
remain in possession of the home, she could buy out Defendant's
net
equity
in the
homeFunding
as forlong
asprovided
Defendant
the
proceeds
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of his equity within ninety (90) days of the signing of the
Decree.

The court ordered that the Plaintiff-Appellant could

petition the court for additional time upon a showing that af·
using due diligence, the home could not be sold within the nir
(90) day period set by the court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendant-Respondent seeks to have this Court
affirm, in its entirety, the Decree of Divorce of the trial a
and asks this court to award to Defendant-Respondent attorney'
fees incurred by Defendant-Respondent on this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In order to supplement and,

in some instances, to

correct the Plaintiff-Appellant's Statement of Facts, DefendE
Respondent submits the following:
When Appellant was divorced from her first husband,
the Appellant's home was sold pursuant to the Decree of Divorc
and the equity in that home was divided equally between AppeL
and her first husband (R. 282).
At the time the parties were married, Respondent hac
debts of $2,034.00 at the B.Y.U. Credit Union and a $500.00 &
at Walker Bank which Respondent paid off by using monthly pay·
ments after the parties were married, and by borrowing money:
the Granite School District Credit Union.

(R. 47, 226, 227,

1).

Appellant gave Respondent $230.00 on May 9, 1969 an•
Sponsored
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Jun·

27, 1969, and on August 7, 1969, the date the parties were married, there was a balance in Respondent's checking account of
$2,241.68, which Appellant considered to be a joint account
after they were married and which went to pay both parties'
obligations.
28).

(R.

192, 193, 228, 285, 286, 289, 290, 300 ex.

With Appellants inheritance of $5,460.00, Appellant pur-

chased furniture to refurbish the living room, including a sofa,
two chairs, a lamp table, coffee table, a dry flower arrangement
and carpet for which the Respondent did not make any claim, and
had one chair recovered; of the inheritance only $200.00 or
$300.00 went into actually improving the house itself.

(R. 303,

304) .
Appellant, at the time of trial, had two children
living at horne, one of whom had reached his majority and who has
received a four year grant in aid scholarship to Brigham Young
and will be living in Provo during the school year and away from
Appellant's residence.

(R. 308,309, 310).

Respondent had not begun living with another woman (R.
186, 316, 317, 331).
Respondent has continued to pay one-half of the house
payment since the parties' separation.

(R.

306,336).

LEGAL ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY ORDERING THAT THE HOME OF
THE PARTIES BE SOLD, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
THAT APPELLANT PAY DEFENDANT HIS EQUITY
WITHIN NINETY (90) DAYS OR PETITION THE
COURT WHEN, AFTER DUE DILIGENCE, THE HOME COULD
NOT BE SOLD WITHIN THE NINETY (90) DAY
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion by ordering that the home of the parties be sold within ninety (9C
days following the entry of the Decree of Divorce.

The only

basis for showing the trial court abused its discretion is

t~

statement that Appellant is deprived of a home in which to

1~

and raise her children.

Appellant does not contend that the

evidence clearly preponderates against the Findings of Fact

~

Conclusions of Law or Decree of Divorce entered by the court
or that there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the
resulting in substantial and prejudicial error.

The burden

~

lant has is of showing that there is such a serious inequity·
has resulted from the Decree of Divorce as to manifest a
abuse of discretion.

~

English v. English, 565 P.2d, 409 (Utah

1977); Westenskow v. Westenskow, 562 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1977).
(emphasis added).
Even though the proceedings in divorce cases are
equitable, and this Court may review the evidence,

considera~

deference is given to the trial court's findings and judgment
because of his perogatives and advantaged position.
Eastman, 558 P.2d 514

Eastman~

(Utah 1976).

Since the trial Judge has considerable latitude of
discretion in the disposition of property, his judgment shoulc
not be changed lightly, and in fact not at all, unless it

wo~

such a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear
abuse of discretion.

Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d lOBO (Utah

1977).
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After hearing the evidence, the trial court found
that Appellant was entitled to $8,000.00 more of the equity
of the horne than Respondent.

This accounted for money which

Appellant had brought into the marriage and had inherited during
the course of the parties' marriage.

Appellant does not dis-

pute the amount of equity awarded to her nor does she dispute
the fact that Respondent is entitled to his share of the equity
in the horne.

The argument that if the horne is sold, Appellant

is deprived of the horne applies equally to Respondent.

Since

the parties' separation, Respondent has not had the ben·efit
of residing in the parties' horne and yet has been obligated to
pay one-half of the house payment during the pendency of this
action.

By allowing both parties to receive the equity from

the horne the court has fulfilled its responsibility of endeavorins
to provide a just and equitable

adjustment of the economic

resources so that the parties might reconstruct their lives on
a happy and useful basis.
1974).

Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah

By freezing Respondent's equity for a period of five

years, Respondent would be precluded from reconstructing his
life on a happy and useful basis.
In Humphreys v. Humphreys, 520 P.2d 193 (Utah 1974),
a case which had a fact situation very similar to the present
case, the parties, during their marriage each contributed their
entire efforts and income to the family enterprise and accumulation of certain property.

The horne was purchased by the parties

1968, and Plaintiff-Appellant claimed that she paid the down payment
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$3,400.00 from the sale of a previously owned home.

The

trial court ordered that the home should be sold and the
proceeds be applied first toward the payment of the mortgage
and liens, then to the judgments against the parties, then
$400.00 to the attorneys for each party, and then toward pa~,
of the debts and then finally, any amount remaining to be
divided equally between the parties.

This Court modified

the Decree and allowed the Plaintiff-Appellant an additional
$3,400.00 of the equity to compensate the Plaintiff-Appellant
for the down payment that was used to purchase the family
home.

In the present case, the trial court has already made

allowance for the monies that the Plaintiff-Appellant contend
she brought into the marriage and acquired by inheritance
during the marriage.

Respondent believes that the Court's

decision in the Humphreys matter should sustain the decision
of the trial court in this matter and that no abuse of discu
exists.
RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S
FEES FOR THIS APPEAL.
Although the trial court ordered that each party

w~

bear his/her own costs and attorney's fees, it is discretiona:
with this Court that attorney's fees on appeal may be awarded
Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate and Investment Co., 3 Utah 2d
279 P.2d 709 (1955), Ehninger v. Ehninger, 569 P.2d 1104 (Uta
1977).

Since Appellant in her argument has stated no substanti

reason or showing that the trial court clearly abused its dis
Respondent believes that Appellant's appeal is without merit>
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therefore Respondent is justified in being awarded attorney's
fees for this appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the reason set forth above and because of Appellant's failure to meet her burden in showing a clear abuse of
discretion by the trial court, the Decree of Divorce should be
affirmed in all respects, and Appellant should be required to
comply with the Decree of Divorce.

In addition,

~espondent

should be awarded his attorney's fees and costs for this appeal.
DATED this

:~~

day of March, 1979.
Respectively submitted,

DAVID M. SWOPE ·
Attorney for Defendant-Respond

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I served a copy of the foregoing Respondent's Brief by hand delivering the same to Mr.
Thomas R. Blonquist, 431 South Third East, Metropolitan Law
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111, this

IY~

day of March,

1979.
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